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Abstract: We analyze the eﬃciency of the masking of instruction patterns using a
chaotic driven clock and power supply, in front of a side attack intruding the power
supply of a microsystem. The diﬀerential analysis is supposedly conducted by corre-
lation power analysis. We demonstrate that the use of a chaotically-driven masking
based on relatively simple circuits may be a signiﬁcant candidate for the protection
of embedded systems.
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1 Introduction
With a ﬁeld less than 20 year old (the ﬁrst paper, by Paul C. Kocher [1], was published in
1998, with the ﬁrst signiﬁcant expansion published in 2000, [2]), the protection against hardware-
level attacks of the information in microsystems, including embedded systems is fast developing,
due to the huge interest of the banks, security companies, card manufacturers, and military,
moreover due to the interest in power minimization [3]. Citing [4], ‘Side Channel Analysis is a
[   ] form of attack [   ] that uses information that leaks, unintentionally, from the real-world
implementations of cryptographic hardware.’ Side-channel attacks (SCA) extract and decode the
executed instructions and the manipulated data in microsystems, bypassing the cryptographic
protections [1], [2]. The basic methods of attack were named simple power analysis (SPA),
respectively diﬀerential power analysis (DPA), depending on the details of the attack. For
various approaches of DPA, see [5].
While the literature includes numerous papers on the attacks and on the sibling topic of power
analysis for software optimization [3], understandably fewer papers present hardware methods of
mitigating these attacks. Several manufacturers include various solutions against side attacks.
For example, Newell and Juliano [4] cite FreeScale Inc., who uses ‘patented DPA functions,
licensed from Cryptography Research.’ Other manufacturers, as MAXIM Inc. and INFINEON
also use various protection means, but details on them are not public. For example, the 32 RISC
‘DeepCover Secure Microcontroller’ MAX32590 released in 2013 by MAXIM includes on the
chip, according to the manufacturer data- sheet, a ‘tamper detection controller’ that ‘monitors
voltage, frequency, temperature, die shield, and external sensors’, erasing essential information
when any type of suspicious external activity is detected.
In [6], [7], and [8] we introduced the masking of the instructions using a chaotically-driven
clock and power supply. However, a detailed analysis of the masking eﬃciency under DPA has not
been performed for that method. In this paper, we provide results of the analysis of diﬀerential
power attacks, when the chaotic masking as above is used to protect the system. The protection
method proposed in [6], [7], and [8] and further analyzed here is, at the hardware level, more of
a proof of concept of the capabilities of the method, not a blueprint solution ready to put into
silicon.
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Figure 1: Block diagram for the hardware for protection against SCA. (a) Diagram with ana-
log control of the voltage. (b) Both the clock and the voltage control are digital signals. (c)
Pulse forming circuit. (d) Controlled voltage regulator. (e) Example of noisy control pulse. (f)
Waveforms from the chaotic circuit and the corresponding pulses generated for control
2 The proposed protection method
Beyond software protection methods, such as speciﬁc algorithms, hardware protection meth-
ods play an essential role today in data and code security, as proved by several speciﬁc chips
produced by companies as the ones quoted in Section 1.
We present in this paper an operation principle demonstrator of the protection method. We
assume that only the external power supply is available to the intruder for monitoring with a
series resistor. While the proposed method is similar to the typical injection of (pseudo-)random
pulses on the power supply line, in this type of protection the random signal produced by the
chaotic circuit is used to drive a controlled voltage regulator (CVR), which modiﬁes the voltage
that powers the microcontroller, moreover is used to generate the clock signal of the system. The
protection circuits include a chaotic signal generator, a pulse shaper, and the CVR, as shown in
Fig. 1 (a-c). The CVR designed and used in this research is shown in Fig. 1 (d) and an example
of control pulse in Fig. 1 (e). The circuits where described in [9] and [8]. More than one level of
voltage jump can be produced with such a scheme, provided that multiple loops with diﬀerent
Zener diodes are used in parallel on the lower branch of the circuit in Fig. 1 (d).
The random character of the pulses produced by the pulse shaper refers to the variation
of their duration, especially on the long run, due to the change of operation condition of the
chaotic circuit (changes in the ambient temperature, ﬂuctuations of the power supply of the
chaotic circuit.) For recordings spaced in time by about 10 minutes, under apparently unchanged
laboratory conditions, variations of the number of samples per pulse were of more than 20 %
for measurements performed during the same day. On the other hand, changes from one pulse
to the other were less than 0.5 %. The slow change of the pulse duration due to the change of
the chaotic regime produced by ambient factors is beneﬁcial for the protection because it makes
diﬃcult the learning of the patterns of the instruction, as they continuously and unpredictably
change. Notice in Fig. 1 (f) that the control pulses remain noisy with an amplitude of the noise
of about 0.5 V (peak amplitude more than 1 V). This high frequency noise makes the masking
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process more eﬀective, therefore we have not tried to reduce the noise. The evaluation of the
randomicity of the clock signal, as produced by the pulse shaper of the chaotic clock generator
proposed in [8] was performed by determining the ﬂuctuations of the width of the pulses. For
this purpose, the time between two successive up-down impulse edges was determined for all
pulses during a long period of time. The analysis showed that the width of the pulses varies by
about 0.1 to 2% over short periods (less than 1 ms), but with almost 40% over longer periods
(minutes to hours). The presented circuits serve only to illustrate the operation principle and
the feasibility. These circuits are not designs for on-chip implementations. On the other hand,
the hardware-level protection discussed in this paper assumes that the protection circuits are
built on the same chip as the protected microsystem (SoC - system on chip technology), or at
least that they are on a chip included in the same package (multi-chip technology).
3 Analysis of the strength of the protection method
Various attack methods and related countermeasures were presented in the literature, see [5],
[10], [11], [12]. Attacks based on correlation analysis are among the most common. The inter-
correlation function for two sequences, fx(n)g and fy(n)g, is deﬁned as Cx;y() = 1N
PN 1
n=0 x[n]y
[n+ ], where  is the delay. Let Vk = (sN ; sN+1; ; sN+T ) be the expected (average) vector stand-
ing for the pattern of an unperturbed (unmasked) instruction k. Let X = (xM ; xM+1; ; xM+T )
be the vector of an instantiation of a masked, unknown instruction. The duration (number of
samples) is taken the same as for Vk, when the clock can be determined independently and the
number of clock periods for an instruction is known. The purpose of the attack is to identify
the instruction from its signature, X. Several approaches for the attack are possible, among
others the determination of the distance between X and all the patterns of the instructions, Vk,
k = 1   n, the computation of the inter-correlations between all Vk and X, or determining the
distances between the Fourier transforms of the unknown, masked sequence X, F (X), and the
Fourier transform of the sequence of the instructions, F (Vk). Some authors, e.g. [5], consider the
correlation power analysis (CPA) a distinct, more advanced method than DPA.
When using correlation functions, attackers may try to determine the instruction in vari-
ous ways, depending on the information they can acquire about the microsystem. When the
attackers are able to determine the patterns of the unmasked instructions, they could proceed
as follows. The attackers may compute in the ﬁrst place the intercorrelation functions between
the ‘clean’ patterns of instructions and segments of the waveform that correspond to one ma-
chine cycle (m.c.), assuming the instructions take one m.c. The attackers may reason that
the true instruction is there where the intercorrelation is the greatest. Denote the ‘clean’ pat-
tern of the instruction #k by X0k . We denote an instance of the masked instruction #j by




(t) o maxtCX0k ;Xmj (t); j 6= k. Then, the instructions are easily identiﬁable. If,
instead, there is some index j such that maxtCX0k ;Xmk (t) < maxtCX0k ;Xmj (t); j 6= k, confusion
appears between the instructions #k and #j.
In the next Section, we demonstrate that a key sub-set of the instruction set of the micro-
controllers in the 16FXXX series is securely masked by the method we proposed in [7], [8] against
CPA analysis. For this purpose, we compute the correlation functions between the waveforms
produced by various instructions when they are masked, respectively unmasked.
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Figure 2: Examples of intercorrelations with masked instructions
4 Results and assessment of the robustness against CPA-SCA
The main results refer to the eﬃciency of the masking as determined by the lack of corre-
lation between the unmasked pattern of the instruction and the masked ones. The results are
summarized in Tables I and II. Table I shows that the maximal values of the self-correlations
of unmasked instruction waveforms is (almost) 1 for all the instructions, as expected, while the
maximal values of the intercorrelations between unmasked instructions is less than 0.8. This al-
lows the easy discovery of the unknown instruction by performing the correlation of its waveform
with the waveforms of the other instructions. In our case, as Table II shows, seven out of eight in-
structions have maximal values of intercorelations with other instructions than with themselves.
For example, the instruction movlw, when masked, better intercorrelates with addwf, andwf,
movf, rrf, and btfss than with itself (larger correlation values, see Table II).
TABLE I. Maximal values of the inter-correlation functions for eight instructions; unmasked
operation, at 4 MHz clock
addwf#2 andwf#7 movf#4 rrf#3 btfsc#4 btfss#3 andlw#2 movlw#7
addwf#2 1 0.73801 0.73584 0.60686 0.39528 0.75491 0.66487 0.78685
andwf#7 0.73801 1 0.85923 0.60065 0.4209 0.77955 0.73043 0.8248
movf#4 0.73584 0.85923 1 0.5919 0.39232 0.76756 0.67754 0.80839
rrf#3 0.60686 0.60065 0.5919 1 0.81175 0.57169 0.5507 0.57
btfsc#4 0.39528 0.4209 0.39232 0.81175 1 0.40628 0.46722 0.38796
btfss#3 0.75491 0.77955 0.76756 0.57169 0.40628 1 0.85267 0.73405
andlw#2 0.66487 0.73043 0.67754 0.5507 0.46722 0.85267 1 0.68391
movlw#7 0.78685 0.8248 0.80839 0.57 0.38796 0.73405 0.68391 1
TABLE II. Maximal values of the inter-correlation functions between eight instructions, when
one instruction is unmasked (ﬁrst column in the table) and the other one is masked (ﬁrst row).
addwf#3 andwf#7 movf#3 rrf#6 btfsc#6 btfss#5 andlw#4 movlw#4
addwf#2 0.4508 0.30583 0.33292 0.27566 0.37544 0.37642 0.30343 0.44512
andwf#7 0.34256 0.36752 0.28884 0.41852 0.39059 0.30863 0.48923
movf#4 0.36011 0.29453 0.38931 0.40252 0.32866 0.45862
rrf#3 0.23007 0.47391 0.29884 0.27176 0.51101
btfsc#4 0.39219 0.22641 0.20155 0.40093
btfss#3 0.3588 0.28241 0.45588
andlw#2 0.21974 0.33482
movlw#7 0.44189
Notice that the ﬁrst table is symmetrical with respect to the main diagonal (Hermitian). Tables
I and II should be considered from the point of view of the identiﬁcation of the instruction
based on correlation functions. Each element of the tables (matrices) is the maximal value of
the correlation function for speciﬁed execution instances of a ﬁrst and second instructions. The
instruction is identiﬁed when the correlation is 1, in Table I. The attacker is supposed here
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to have access to the true waveform of the instruction and to be able to directly or indirectly
determine the clock frequency of the attacked system.
Assume that the attackers have acquired the waveforms of the non-masked instructions.
The attackers can determine the true clock frequency of a system by running in a loop the
correlation between an interpolated, respectively extrapolated version of the clean waveforms
with the unknown, masked waveforms. For some value(s) of the interpolation, the correlation
function exhibits the maximal highest value and a strong periodicity, due to the machine cycles
in the waveform. In that case of interpolation, the time alignment between the known ‘clean’
waveform and the given waveform with unknown clock is the best and, therefore, the unknown
clock period is found. We assume that the attackers have performed this determination. Next,
the attackers can perform with a known interpolation factor all the intercorrelations, to extract
the information on the instructions in the attacked program.
Figure 2 shows examples of self-correlations of unmasked and masked instructions and cor-
relations between masked and unmasked instructions. As expected, in all cases the correlations
exhibit the periods of the clock and of the machine cycles, but not the instruction patterns.
Notice in Table II that values of selfcorrelation for a speciﬁed instruction that are lower than
values of the correlation of the same instruction with others means that the criterion of maximal
value of correlation will not work for the discovery of the instruction, based on correlations.
5 Discussion and conclusions
This paper synthesized partial and preliminary results reported in [6], [7], [8] and presented a
thorough analysis of the masking eﬃciency under CPA attacks against a microsystem protected
with the masking method proposed. The method is based on the randomization of both the
clock and the supply voltage. The randomization uses an approach based on a simple chaotic
system and the related circuitry.
The proposed protection can be eﬀective only when the attacker has no access to the chaotic
circuit, or to the controlled voltage regulator. These circuits should be included in the same
package as the microsystem. Moreover, the electromagnetic radiation (EMR) from the CVR
should not be easy measured, because it reveals to the attacker the control of the voltage (that
is, the chaotic circuit output). With the chaotic signal known, the attacker would be able to
demodulate the masked signal and the masking one. In addition to limiting the direct and indirect
(EMR mediated) access to the chaotic signal, the protection must insure that the modulating
signal and the protected one have similar characteristics, for example, similar amplitudes and
heavily overlapping spectra. Only with all these conditions satisﬁed, could the protection be
eﬀective. We reported only on an idea demonstration, not on an eﬀective circuit. Therefore,
neither the condition on the amplitude of the swings of the VCR, nor the overlapping spectra
condition is satisﬁed.
Concluding, we presented a method for instruction masking against CPA and showed that the
method proves highly eﬀective even with simple circuits for protection. The core of the method
is the use of a chaotic circuit to alter at the same time the clock frequency and the supply voltage
of the protected microsystem. The method is appropriate for integration either on the chip of
the microsystem or in a multi-chip package.
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